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The President’s Proposed
Corporate Tax Reforms:
A Move Toward Tax Neutrality
Dallas S. Batten and Mack Ott
HE President has proposed a significant change
in the federal income tax law, The President~sTax
Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and
Simplicity, (hereafter PTFI. Included in FTP are pro-
posed corporate business tax reforms that, in general,
would lower themarginal taxrate on business income
while broadening the corporate tax base. Because, on
net, these proposals would increase the average tax
rate on business income, they have been widely criti-
cized as having deleterious effects on U.S. investment,
employment and economic growth.’
By focusing on the negative macroeconomic effects,
however, these critics have overlooked some of the
proposed tax refonn’s positive allocative effects. The
President’s proposal would make tax rates across in-
dustries and activities more uniform and reduce the
distorting influences of inflation, thereby diminishing
the role of the tax structure in the allocation of pro-
ductive resources.
Dallas S. Batten, a research officer at the FederalReserve BankofSt
Louis, is currently on leave as a seniorstaffeconomist atthe Councilof
EconomicAdvisers. Views expressed are not necessarily those ofthe
counciL Mack Ottis a senioreconomist atthe FederalReserve Bankof
St Louis. James C. Poleltiprovided research assistance.
‘See, for example, Rowen (1985), Sterngold (1985) and Yemma
(1985).
‘the purpose of this article is to examine the alloca-
tive effects of the President’s proposal. We begin by
describing the concepts of economic efficiency and
tax neutrality, twoimportant criteria forevaluating the
reform. Then, the basic points contained in the Presi-
dent’s proposal are outlined and evaluated against
these criteria.
ECONoMiC EFFICiENCY ANI) TAX
NEIYITB~YLITY
Fundamentally, economic efficiency means using
resources in their highest valued activitv A simple
example using the demand fur and the supply of
apples demonstrates the concept of efficiency and
shows how competitive markets result in efficient
resource use? Thesupply curve in figure 1 represents
the minimum price that producers must receive if
they are to supply a specific quantity of apples. This
price is determined by the ‘opportunity cost” (the
highest valued alternative use) of the resources used
2This example is simplified for illustrative purposes. It ignores the
issuesof externalitiesand imperfect competition. For amore com-
plete discussion,see Hirshleifer (1980).
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Efficient Production
Guanlity and Price Determined by Market
Figute 2
Inefficient Production
Quantity and Price Distorted by lax Subsidy
to produce apples. The demand curve in figure 1
portrays the highest price consumers are willing to
pay for any specific quantity of apples.
The onl price that is common to both the supply
and demand curves ipi is called the “equilibrium”
price; it is the only price at which the quantity de-
manded equals the quantity supplied (Ql. This sug-
gests that, at equilibrium, the value that people place
on each apple equals the opportunity cost of the
resources used to produce it. This iswhy the competi-
tive market equilibrium represents an economically
efficient allocation of resources.
Producing more lQ,) or less (Q,) apples than Q’
would be inefficient. Either too many or too few re-
sources would be allocated to apple production given
the valuepeople place on apples compared with other’
products that those resources could produce. The
market will induce producers to provide exactly (It. If
ft apples were produced, consumers would be will-
ing topay only P per apple, which is less than the cost
of production, P,; producers then would decrease
output, lowering costs and releasing resources to
other higher-valued uses. If Q, were produced, the
adjustment would proceed conversely, with output
rising and resources for apple production being bid
away from other activities whose products were not a
highly valued as apples.
Taxes: Mw •it’cdge .E/jkct and Reduced
izffic:icnet~
Taxes and subsidies change the allocation of re
sources if they alter the incentives confronting pro
ducers or consumers. In particulai-, some taxes oi
subsidies drive a wedge between the prices that con-
sumers pay and producers receive. A tax on apple
production — or on the resources used to produce
apples — raises firms’ costs of production. This situa-
tion is depicted in figure 2 as the upward shift in the
supply curve to S,~from its position without taxes ot
subsidies, S. As a result of the tax, the equilibriurr
price of apples rises to P. and the quantity producec
(and sold) falls to Q,; the economically efficient quan-
tity of apples, Q~, is no longer produced because the
tax alters producer incentives. At Ct the value thai
people place on apples (Pi exceeds theactual value ol
the resources used in apple production (P1. The
wedge, the difference between these values (P, — P1, b
the amount of the tax.
Likewise, subsidizing theproduction ofapples per-
haps through use of tax preferences such as special
deductions, credits or abatementsl shifts the supply
Price Price
of nflles of a~tpIes
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curve to S,~,, in figure 2, resulting in more apples being
produced (ft) than is economically efficient. At Q, the
value of x-esources used to produce apples (PJ exceeds
the value that people place on apples (P1.The differ-
ence (P. — P,) is the amount of the subsidy and a
measure of the economic inefficiency.
‘to summarize, taxes and subsidies cause economic
inefficiency by affecting the quantity of the good pro-
duced. A tax on production results in too few re-
sources employed in apple production, while subsi-
dies motivate too many resources devoted to apple
production.’ In either case, resources are wasted, the
value of the economy’s output is reduced and con-
sumers are correspondingly worse off than if there
had been no tax or no subsidy.
~YOnneutral Taxes: A Cause of.Econoinie
.hwthc:ency
As we have seen, some taxes and subsidies distort
resource use, causing inefficiency and making people
worse off Thus, a useful benchmark against which to
evaluate both the existing tax system and thepotential
benefits of tax reform is an ideal, nondistorting “neu-
tral” tax system. A neutral tax is one that causes no
change in production, consumption or investment. In
the context offigure 1,the imposition of a neutral tax
would not alter the position of the supply curve.
Consequently, a neutral tax does not induce inef-
ficient resource use.
‘Of course, manypeople feelthatgovernment should guideresource
use in orderto attain ends not necessarily reflected in marketprices.
For example, Sen. Russell Long, former chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee, was characterized in a recent Wall Street
Journal interviewas beingopposed to ‘(rielinquishing tax law tothe
raw forcesofthe free market.
I do not regard this matter of collecting taxes as simply a matter of
bringing In revenue to finance government,” he says, “just as the
appropriationsprocessseeksto do morethanpay for nationaldefense,”
Toshy awayfrom using thetaxcode to promotethegeneral welfare,he
says,is to be ascallousasthosewho “don’t want to bebothered doing
anything that benefits anyone except their own greedy selves.” (Birn-
baum, 1985)
This view is widespread in both housesof Congress and on both
sides of the aisle. For example, Senate Finance Committee Chair-
man Robert Packwoodconcursin usingthe tax codefor “legitimate
social purposes.” (McGinley, 1985). Frequently, such social pur-
poses are identified with a particular industry as in Sen. Malcolm
Wallop’s defense of tax preferences forthe oil industry: These
provisions are backed by sound tax policy and protecta higher
public need, namely energy independence.” (Wallop, 1985) Con-
versely, Sen. Bill Bradley, a proponent of tax reform, argues.
The best allocator ofcapital is the free market, not the Senate Finance
Committee.. . aslaudable as all these credits anddeductions maybe,
when you put them in the tax code, rates are higher than they would
otherwise be. (McGinley, 1985)
Obviously, any tax that can be reduced by a change
ofactivities is not neutral. For example, an income tax
is not a neutral tax because it varies with income.
Thus, for individuals, an income tax lowers the cost of
leisure (which is not taxed) and induces people to
substitute more leisure in place of income-generating
(taxed) acti%qties. The extent of tius substitution is
small, ofcourse, when considering the impact oftaxes
on corporate income. A corporation’s shareholders
are unlikely to place much value on the leisure time of
corporate assets — or that of the corporation’s work-
ers. Consequently, the tax-free status of leisure does
not preclude neutral taxation ofbusiness income.
Although business income taxation could be set up
in anearly neutral fashion, in reality, it seldom is. Tax
preferences exist explicitly toencourage specificactiv-
ities that would not be undertaken otherwise. Capital-
intensive industries benefit from certain investment
tax credits and accelerated depreciation that are not
as remunerative to less capital-intensive industries.
Some capital expenditures are treated as a current
expense (for example, intangible drilling costs), and
depreciation deductions based on historical costs are
subject to distortions from inflation.” Some business
income is not taxed at all (for example, additions to
bank reserves for’ loan defaults and the income of
limited liability partnerships), while other business
income is taxed twice (corporate dividendsi. Finally,
taxrates vary according to arbitrary realization proce-
dures (capital gains vs. income). In each of these in-
stances, taxes can be altered by changing the firm’s
production activity — its input mix, legal structure,
product mix or timing ofsales. Tothe extent that such
tax-induced changes exist, the tax system is not neu-
tral; the result is a distortion of resource use and
economic inefficiency.
Illustraiions ofNonnesdral Taxes
To illustrate the potential allocative effects of the
curt-entbusiness tax structure, consider table 1, which
contains effective tax rates for asample oflarge corpo-
rations in various industries over the past four years.
This table presents average (not marginal) and actual
(not expected) tax rates. It nonetheless provides an
indication of just how diverse tax rates have been
across industries as well as how important taxprefer-
ences may have been in allocating resources among
~Fora discussion of the distortions in depreciation accounting and
the taxacts of1981 and 1982, see Ott (1984).
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Table 1
Comparison of Tax Rates on Large Corporations in Various U.S. Industries, 1980—83
Industry
1 1980 1981 1982 1983 1980.83
average
Aerospace 164% 68% 10 6i% 140% 97%
Beverages 280 28.8 205 187 232
Broadcasting ,. 89 185
Ghemicals 137 50 ~l77~ fl 0~ 36
Computers and office equipment 24.9 25 3 26 4 263 258
t3onstruchon 159 07
Electronics ano appliances 24.5 17.1 14.3 74 162
Financial institutions 5 8 2 7 13 8) 64 38
Focdprocessors 35.6 26 8 31 62 5 9 29 5
Glass and concrete ‘ . 17.5
Instrument companies 37 1 266 21.9 328 295
Insurance . (63) 99
Investment companies ‘ 21 39 3
Metal manutacluring 153 10.2
Metal products 2 .‘ 30.2 15 1
Mining
Motor vehicies , . 3 5
Paper and wood products ci.4~ (142) 361 f05~ c295
Petroleum’ 311 21 7 182 21 3 235
Pharmaceuticals 39 2 35 9 32 7 27 2 32 9
Retailing 341 223 204 200 229
Rubber .. , 390 19.6
Soaps and cosmetics ., . 33 3 35 6
Telecommunications I 1 6 4 8
Tobacco 31 4 31 3 363 33.8 33 3
Transportation
Airlines 3.0
Railroads 107 ~7S1 41 33 24
Truck:ng 375 461 369 345 382
Utilities 109 103 156 71 10?
Wholesaiers ., 36.1 348
Source Joint Gomm-ttee on Taxation. November 30. 1984 as repored in Owly Report for &er.utives. December3, 1984 IDER Nc 232~
p J-1
An ndustry is .ncluded in th s labe only if substantially the same companIes are inc’uded in the sarnole each year
Hale not computed on boo~toss
The 1980 and 1981 rates are not availab.e the 1980-63ave’age is not conputea
‘Some corrpan’es ‘ricluded in the 1982 and 1983 group were classified w th crUde oil production in 1980 and 1981
In 1980 and 1981. the ut. ties group included AT&T and GTE The 1980 and 1981 uti;’i.es rateis ‘estalea to ncude or’ y electricand gas
ut’,ittes
iitIti’,Iii’s liii i’.\afilç)I(. iii 1H243 tIir~,’ Iuli’, ranged ~%iiOlPS~tIi’iS 1 l.$ P~’”~’~
111)111 dii cUt,rliu’ Ia~ rali @1 1.0 peteriii that is a
stiii~uI~’’ tin liii’ clirutical industn to a 3,9 jn’icr’iii Ii~large I)aIl. tili’st’ \aittti(,lts air (lilt’ tO\ an,ttion’~ii
alt’ toe liii’ soaps toil (osini’tit’s iidii,,tr~ hirtln’r the ta~credits ,u,iilahle Ii) the c’oi ptnatint)s I his i
won’, providers cit stflliis Iiici’cl ,tihst,tiiti,tlIv tliuisc’ ,iiuili Clear by iii i’\aiiilil,ttit)i) @1 t~thIi 2 n liirll dis
i~itis: tic,,i, Iirt;uiri;tI iilstiliitioti’, ‘I I p ‘rittil lii ~tIavs tile data toe lASt tht’ most rvei’iit ~rar a~aiIaldiTable 2
The Impact of Tax Credits on Tax Rates, 1981 (dollar amounts in millions)
Tax Rates Tax Credits
Posses
Totat Investment Foreign sions
Credit Credit Credit Credit
asa asa asa asa
Percent Percent Percent Percent
Income Cor- of Cor- of ot Cor- US. of Car
Subject parate Effective Net of porate Invest Corporate porate Posses- porate
Industry to Tax lax Percent’ Credit2 Total5 Tax ment Tax Foreign Tax sions Tax
ALL
,N0USTRIES 5241.4960 5102,2560 423% t8 1% $584240 572% $‘8.887 0 185% $21829.0 21 3’~51.9460 1 9%
Agriculture. Forest
F~shing 1.2780 5570 32.2 240 1420 255 1280 230 3.0 05 60 11
Mining 9479.0 4.2450 44.8 178 2556.0 60.2 5820 137 1,958.0 461 0.0 00
consrruction 66100 2.3600 357 283 4900 208 3340 142 107.0 45 20 01
ALL
MANUFACTURING 133.4160 595550 446 226 294390 494 9.1450 154 177370 298 18670 3.1
Food 10.1630 45740 450 276 17680 387 8500 186 7700 166 1170 26
Tobacco 2.1790 1.0030 460 357 2250 224 1510 151 560 56 14.0 14
Texfi’e and Mit
Proaucts 14700 6530 444 339 1550 237 1250 191 140 21 20 03
Furniture and
Fxfures 9320 4030 432 386 430 107 300 74 40 10 00 00
PaperProducts 38430 1.6180 42’ 218 7820 483 3030 ‘87 4610 265 10 01
Printing and
Pubhsn’no 49290 2.1200 430 338 4520 21.3 3500 165 97.0 46 40 0.2
Chemicals 15294.0 6.8950 451 ‘82 4.1080 596 8730 127 2.2500 326 8920 129
RubberaroPlasl.c 20340 8710 428 267 3270 375 1120 129 1900 218 80 09
LeatherProducts 7550 3340 442 389 40.0 120 190 57 5.0 15 120 36
S:one.OIay.Gass 17290 7650 442 237 3560 465 1490 195 1950 255 30 04
°rmary Metals 50650 21220 419 234 9380 442 6490 306 3040 143 40 02
FabricateoMetas 66980 2.8690 428 33.1 6490 226 3260 114 2770 97 200 07
Machrie’y 15.2190 6.8970 453 238 3.2680 471 9390 136 2.2290 323 360 05
Eleclrica
Eeclronic 9.5610 4282.0 448 241 19740 461 6310 147 7700 180 4730 1’0
MmorVenices 4.2920 1.8690 435 202 10030 537 7390 395 2180 117 50 03
Ira’isportatior
Eqcip’nent 2.0050 8800 439 256 3470 394 ‘220 139 2050 233 00 00
Instruments 45310 20570 454 348 4810 234 2930 ‘42 4720 229 ‘440 7C
UTILIT’ES 238430 ‘07270 45C 213 5.6600 528 5334C 497 228.0 21 220 02
Transcorlalior 54130 22570 417 280 7390 327 67 0 297 530 23 00 00
relecomircr.icalions 81130 37690 ~67 169 24210 639 7283.0 603 670 8 220 06
E’eclr’c aro
Sar’.tary 103170 468’O 454 211 2.5020 535 23800 50.8 1080 23 00 CC
WHOLESALE AND
RETAIL 323600 125’60 387 316 22340 178 1.5930 127 420.0 34 410 00
Wholesale 16.9660 67000 395 334 ‘.0380 155 6950 04 2640 39 38C 06
FINANcE
INSURANCE
REAL ESTATE 219030 8.1590 373 276 2.1210 260 8880 109 ‘ 1900 .4F 3000
Banxing 76640 2.8030 366 ‘96 13010 464 350 125 936.0 334 DC ~3
SERVIcES 120340 4100.0 341 245 ‘.1560 282 8780 214 ‘830 45 30 C
Ho,e.s are ot’ier
inooag 9870 3950 40.1 322 isc 197 610 154 110 28 10 03
Source U S Departmentol Commerce. Statistics of Income 1981. CorporateIncome Tax. Table2
torporate tax divided by incomesub~ec; to lax
Gorporatetax less Iota’ credits divided by ‘ncorrie subject to tax.
Sum of,nvestmenttax creoits, foreign tax credts. U.S. possessions taxcredits, work .ncentive tax credits jobs taxcredit. nonconvent.onal
luels tax cred,t ana research activities tax creditFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUiS AUS.USI75EPTEME3ER 1955
In general, industries with pt’oportionally high tax
credits (table 21 correspond with the large corpora-
tions facing low tax rates table ii and vice versa. tn
particular, chemicals, banking and utilities each have
high ratios of credits to tax and low tax rates for 1981.
Conversely) food, instruments and wholesalers have
low ratios of tax credits and high tax rates.
These tax credit ratios differ within industrial
groups as well as across them. Within the utilities
group, fot’example, compare taxcredit ratios fortrans-
portation (32.7) and telecommunications 63.9) in table
2 with their corresponding tax t’ates in table 1, or
compare the overall finance, insurance and real estate
taxcredit ratio (26.01 and that forbanking (46.4) in table
2 with their corresponding tax rates in table 1.
Profit-seeking investors typically will ensure that
their expected after-tax rates of return are the same
across alternative investments, adjusting for risk dif-
ferences. Iftax rates differ across industries, however,
the expected before-tax rates of return will vary with
the tax rate. Consequently, some higher-earning in-
vestment opportunities, when compared on a before-
tax basis, will be passed over in favor of investments
that have lower before-tax, but higher expected after-
tax, rates of return. A neutral tax system would result
in the same relative ranking of investment opportuni-
ties before and after taxes. Tables I and 2 suggest that
the present taxstructure does not have this character-
istic. A tax reform that produced more uniform tax
rates across industries would generate more efficient
allocation of resources because investments would he
chosen more in line with their socially relevant,
before-tax yields.




The President’s proposed business tax reform con-
sists of four primal)’ adjustments. These adjustments
would
(II Lower the corporate tax rate from 46 pei’cent to 33
percent;
(2) Shift the income tax burden proportionally — from
personal taxes (clown 6 percent) to corporate taxes
(up 24 percent);
(3) Reduce nonneutralities in the tax code by broaden-
ing the tax base and repealing tax subsidies; and
14) Reduce inflation distortions of resource allocation
by indexing inventory costs and depreciation de-
ductions to reflect price changes.
While the focus of our discussion is on the third
general feature, the reduction of nonneutralities, the
analysis cannot be undertaken without considering
the other three.
The President’s tax proposal was set up to be
revenue-neutral.”~ Consequently, in order to lower
the corporate tax rateyet shift the tax burden from the
personal to the corporate tax, it was necessary to
increase corporate tax revenues by broadening the tax
base — that is, by removing subsidies, exemptions and
credits. Their removal provides just about enough
additional revenues to offset the impact of the rate
reductions, corporate and individual. This revenue
enhancement also extends to the reduction of in-
flation distortions. By indexing depreciation fot- in-
flation, much of the rationale for the accelerated de-
preciation system is removed. ‘J’hus, the protection of
the depreciation deduction’s real value compensates
for the lower depreciation deductions.
The impact of these changes on total tax revenues
can be seenat the bottom oftable 3. Corporate tax and
other federal tax revenues over the five years 1986—90
would rise by about $120 billion, while personal tax
revenues would fall by $132 billion. The result is that
overall tax revenues over the five years would be ap-
proximately unchanged — less than a one-half per-
cent overall decrease — from what they would have
been in the absence of tax reform.
Yet, there is more to the reform proposal. The Ti-ca-
suty’s estimates of tax revenues over the 1986—90 pe-
riod are based on an extrapolation of current macro-
economic output arid growth; this ignores the
reallocative or microeconomic effects of the reforms.
With the repeal of various tax subsidies reducing
profitability in some business sectors, and the net
reduction in marginal tax t-ates increasing profitability
in other sectors, there would be a reallocation of
resources. A majorargument in favorofthis tax reform
is that it results in a more efficient allocation of pro-
ductive resources. That is, the decrease in output in
sectors losing tax subsidies will be exceeded by the
increase in output in sector’s benefiting from net de-
clines in marginal tax rates.
‘This is clearly stated in the summary of The President’s Tax Pro-
posals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity (p. 7);
Takentogether, the President’s proposals are “revenue neutral” (plus-
or-minus 15% of iota) revenues) — using conventional estimating
procedures, without changing macro-economic assumptions. That is.
under these assumptions, the proposals would, when fully effective,
raise virtually the same amount of revenueascurrent law.
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An estimate of the overall gain (a part of which
results from increased efficiencyl due to the Presi-
dent’s proposed reforms has been computed by the
Treasury Department;
For reasons suggested above, it is reasonable to expect
improved economic performance as a result of the
President’s tax proposals. The i’reasurv Department
estimates that the effect ofthe proposals would be to
cause teal GNP to be at least 1.5 percent higherby 1995
than it would be under current law. Because of the
inherent uncertainty in such forecasts, however, this
additional growth has not been added to Administra-
tion forecasts and is not reflected in higher revenue
estimates.’
The estimated 1.5 percent rise in the level of output
results from resource reallocations that would be in-
duced by the proposed tax reforms, In that sense, the
proposed repeal of many so-called tax expenditures
— that is, tax subsidies, exemptions, credits and the
like — are sources of a rise in U.S. wealth. Repeal of
these tax expenditures, which are subsidies of pro-
duction in the beneficiary industries, releases re-
sources to higher-valued uses. Thus, the value of pro-
duction, in other words. income, and its capitalized
value, wealth, will rise as aresult ofthe reforms. Tosee
more tangibly the source of such tax reform benefits,
consider the following description of specific tax re-
forms outlined in table 3.
XLatl’alitt/ Toward Location of105100w
U.S. corporate income is subject to the U.S. income
tax regardless of where such income is generated.
Corporations, however, receive credits against their
U.S. tax liabilities for taxes paid to foreign govern-
ments. (Seetable 2 for the impact offoreign taxcredits
across industries.) Under current tax law, corpora-
tions may receive larger credits from overseas produc-
eSee The President’s Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness,
Growth and Simplicity, p. 7. Estimates of the gain based on the
predecessor to the President’s proposal, the U.S. Treasury’s Tax
Reform For Fairness, Sirnplicify and Economic Growth (1984), pro-
lected similar gains. Allison, Fullerton and Makin (1985) estimated
that the Treasury’s tax reform proposal would increase GNP by
about 1.2 percent over what it would be under 1973 tax law, This
corresponds to a rise in wealth of over $895.1 billion dollars at
current prices. For thecurrent U.S. population, this would amount to
over$3,700per personatcurrent prices.See Allison, Fullerton, and
Makin (1985), p. 12, table3. Notethat theseestimated gains do not
exhaust the potential efficiencygains from even moredramatic tax
reform. Again, using the 1973 tax code as the base, Ballard,
Shoven, and Whalley (1985) have estimated the efficiency gains
from an alternative lump-sum tax system designed to avoid com-
pletelytheresource misallocationthatplagues thecurrentsystem to
be between $4.0 and $7.3 trillion in 1/1985 dollars.
tion than from the equivalent domestic production.>
This amounts to a subsidy offoreign production for
U.S. corporations in high-tax foreign countries. The
Treasury proposal would eliminate this subsidy by
changing the foreign taxcredit to abilateral basis. U.S.
corporations would be allowed to claim credit for
taxes paid in each foreign country up to a limit of the
equivalent U.S. tax. Since the U.S. tax rate under the
Treasury proposal would be lower than most indus-
trial nations, it is likelythat some overseas production
would be repatriated.’
In addition, the proposal would change some ac-
counting rules that allow firms to reduce tax liabilities
by transshipping goods or changing title to them in
offshore facilities. Also, the so-called possessions tax
credit, which applies predominantly to Puerto Rico,
would be replaced with a wage credit. The result of
this change would be to limit U.S. corporate tax credit
to job-creating production in Puerto Rico.As shown in
table 3, such reformswould result in an expected $18.5
billion increase in tax revenues during the 1986—90
period. Not shown in the table, but clearly important,
would be any U.S. production increases induced by
removal ofthe tax subsidy.
A~cutrai/tr howard Capital .lavcs’tnwat
Currently, tax deductions for the cost of deprecia-
tion of capital equipment and structures arebased on
their historical cost. This creates abias favoring invest-
ment in less durable over more durable equipment
and structures when the expected inflation rate is
moderate or high. The 1981 and 1982 tax acts revised
depreciation methods — the Accelerated Cost Recov-
‘Thisis because thecurrent taxcredit is computedon an overall or
equivalently, anaverage basis.Forexample, supposeaU.S. corpo-
ration has taxable income of $1,000 each in countries A and B
country Ahasa 60 percent tax rate and country B hasa 20 percen
tax rate. Under currentlaw, the corporation hasaU.S. tax liability o
$920 on its foreign income — 46 percent of $2,000. It receives
foreigntaxcreditof$800 —60 percentof$1,000in country Aand 2C
percent of$1,000 in country B—so that its net U.S. tax on foreigr
income is $120. Under the reform, thetaxcredit would be computec
with regardto the tax paid in each individual country and limited tc
the equivalent U.S. tax. Thus, in this example,the foreign tax credi
would fall to $533 — the maximum of 33 percent under the lowei
proposedU.S. corporate tax in country Aand theactual 20 percen’
in country B. Asa result, the profitability offoreign production woulc
decline relativeto domestic production.
OThe corporate tax rates in most malor industrial countries exceec
the proposed 33 percent U.S. rate; France, 50 percent; Germany.
56 percent; The Netherlands, 43 percent; United Kingdom, 3
percent(as of 1986);Japan, 43.3percenton retained earnings, 33.3
percent on distributed earnings; Canada, 46 percent. See U.S
Treasury (1984), vol.1, p. 260.
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Table 4
Effective Corporate Tax Rates on Income from Equity-Financed
Investments for 46 Percent Taxpayer under ACRS’
Inflation rate (percent) Assetclass —
Type of asset (years) 10
Autumohiles light 3 75% 9% 18°o
lucks
Most other producer~ 5 47 4 16
durable equiprnenl
Ra.troad eQuipment 10 6 19 31
Uti!rties equ.prnent IS 8 33 43
and low~income housing
Structures 18 27 39 45
Source PTP. p 136
Assumpttons Real return alter lax •s 4 percent fhe inveslmeril lax credit selected is the maximum
allowahe for new equipmenl f6 percent on three-year equipment and 10 percent on five- lO- and
15-year equipment Effectivetax ratesaro the difference betweenthe realbetore-fax rate ot return and
the real after-tax rateot return divided by the real before-tax rateof relurn
ccv system (ACRSI — to counteract the effects of in- paperprodurK indu~tn.whirR put 882 percent iii Is
flatiun by a more rapid write-off of assets, especially investment into equipment, received an l’l’C covering
longer-lived assets, such as structures.As table 4 illus- 18.7 pet-cent of its tax liability and had a net negative
trates, howevet’, the bias against more durable equip- tax ntte (—14.2 percent) in 1981. In contrast, the to-
ment and structures remained a feature of the tax bacco products industry put 68.8 percent of its invest-
code. While the bias naitows as the inflation rate rises, ment into equipment. resulting in an ITC covering 15.1
it remains heavily skewed in favorofshort-lived equip- percent of its tax liability and a 31.3 percent effective
ment investment, tax tate.
This bias against investment in structures does not To reduce these biases and their nonneutral tax
impinge evenly on the earnings of all industries. Some effects, the President’s taxproposal would revamp the
industries invest alarger proportion of their capital in depreciation accounting deduction and repeal ITC.
equipment than others. As table 5 shows, across all ACRS would be replaced with the Capital Cost Recov-
industries, equipment accounts for more than four- ety System (CCRS). CCRS differs from ACRS in three
fifths of investment, but the proportion varies widely; important respects;
the tobacco products and pharmaceuticals industries
First, CCRS would allow cost recovery ot the real or
are on the lowside, while the motorvehicle and paper inflation-adjusted cost nf depreciable assets, iather
industries at-c quite high. than only the original, nominal cost. Second, CCRS
would assign propei’Lv among new i-ecovet-v classes
‘the importance of such investment patterns is their based upon economic depi-eciation rates. ‘l’hir-d, CCRS
impact on tax rates, both from the biasin thedeprecia- would prescribe depreciation schedules and recovery
tion system (table 4) and the investment tax credit periods which produce systematic investment incen-
IITCI. ITC applies only to equipment; no credit is given tives that are ncuti-al across t-ecovety classes. (PIP,
forstructures.Thus, industries with high propottional p. 138)
investment in equipment (table 5) tend to have high Alongwith this revamping of depreciation accounting,
ratios of ITC to tax liabilities (table 2) and, conse- ITC would be repealed. l’he result is to drastically
quentl~,lower tax rates (table 1) than firms with lower reduce the biases against durable equipment and
equipment-to-investment t-atios. For- example, the structures. As can be seen by compat-ing tables 4 and
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Table 5
Investment Expenditures and the Proportion Invested in
Equipment by Selected Industries (dollaramounts in millions)
Source U S Departrrontof Commerce Census of Manufacturers. 1977
6, the effective tax rates on equipment are changed
from subsidies for short-lived equipment to a level tax
rate across all durabilities, and the bias against struc-
tures is reduced to a few percentage points from its
current huge spread. Note also that the indexing for
inflation removes that taxdistortion as an influence on
asset choice. Correspondingly, there would he a nar-
rowing of the tax rate differentials across industries.
tory tax rates is accomplished without sacrificing in-
vestment incentives necessary to stimutate continued
economic growth tor the economy as a whole. ‘(‘he
CCRS depreciation r-ates and recovery periods pro-
duce effective tax i’ates which would stimulate new
investment in depreciable assets. ‘(‘he indexing of de-
preciation allowances for inflation and the classthca’
tion of assets on the basis of economic depreciation
would ensure that the ccas system provides neutral
investment incentives. (PIP. p. 1483
It is important to emphasize that these reforms are Another’ form of investment whose yields are dis-
not intended to be neutr-al in the sense of removing toned by the cun-r’ent tax code is inventories. The costs
incentives to invest. ‘I’he new depreciation scheme ofmain;aining inventories are arelatively more impor-
(CCBS retains ~-ite-off periods for capital r’ecoverv tant part ofbusiness in the senice sector’, particularly
that are shorter than the anticipated econoniic lives of wholesale and retail trade, than in manufactur’ing.
the assets. Rather, the neutrality sought is between Inflation reduces the r’eal deductible expense in-
investments of varying dur’ations; curt-ed in inventory replacement. This tends to lower
the pr’ofitabilit’v of production in r’etail and wholesale
trade relative to manufacturing both directly and mdi—
rectlv (by inducing a smaller inventory level than oth-
erwise would he held. The Pr’esident’s proposal
‘Ehe proposed CCRS depreciation system, in conjunc’
tion ~x4th i-cpeal of the investment tax credit and other
capital and business taxation proposals, makes possi-
ble a substantial lowering of statutory tax rates for
individuals and comorations. ‘(‘his reduction in statu—
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Table 6
Effective Tax Rates on Equity-Financed
Investments in Equipment and
Structures1
Asset Type ~exampbe) -- Pd- Field-
Equipment:
four-year depneciat~orautos; 16’-’ 18°c
i’ve-year cepreriati-an Itrucks corrpu’ens 16 lB
o~ice eoiJipt’lenti
six year de~re~’~~ S-ion :cons:rLichon 7 18
rracninery a ‘tratt. insl’Lmentsi
seve.-i-year depreciation tfumn’ti.‘e incust at 17 ‘8
machiner~corimun-carlons and railroad
equiprn-’nt;
ic-year ospreciarion lshps turbines ptanr 17 18
anc equipment for e.ectr:c jtitities;
Structure:
26-yea’ deprecation nnoustn.at and 23 25
,Mm’rercia hui:dings. renta. “ousing;
Sauce PTP a 147
Assumes 33 percerr snarurory tax rate and 4 perceni requirec
reiurn after tax and rianon The effecltve tax mare m the entity
level may he tower than reoo’ted hereon everaged investments
nepcric’ng on the degree of ce~t-financeanti tne reation
between the interest rale on debt anc the rate of return on the
mvestrnent Effect-ye tax rates on d.fferent proporly ~nh n a
‘ecoverv class may vary somewhat depending on expe’ienced
economic deorecation ‘ales
-Assumes application ot a 10 perceri orviderro-pa’d nienuctior to a
corporation ~f’,cndist--oules 100 pc-cent of :ls earnings der’v~c
‘rorlr Oep’eoable assets
Assunies ro d,strhutioo of rornorate earr-ngs derived 4rorp
riepreciahlc assets
-The dite’ences hotween the 16 cercent ettective lax rate Sir
asses ard 2 and toe 17 percnrt effnct.vc fax’are ~o’
eqjiprrerit w th so yea’ through 10 yea’ dearecialon wr-te-ot’
neriods are cue to ‘ouneirig and are not sion~ficant.
~uiriltl ,illi-~i,tti-iRk lri,is h~innli-~cn~ tin
iltiilli(it\ t~
1
,hini~chill l-~1)i’r1si’ td\ (lC’(Iiirlriiti
\—, .—~litn~ci iii i;~Ji~. .1. lii tt~tili it ,,nln-!t n-lii
tIle l.i~ itch’ liii Itnrlittelt nt,uld hi an nitta-,i
thtii)t)I_Lte t.i\ t(’I’ttLil’~’ (ILltItlr4 luMli 911 itt ilpijuil 52l17
lii iii
ltiiiihihi izi’tiitalicl li~ nntifltltttiiills i., ‘.til)tcit lii
clirtilli- i,i~,ttii,ii.It ts’~inIitcitIi, the eitl}i(iiate ta\ lltPti
iIi~icli-uil’, i_tic’ ‘nil ttttnt tIii~alter—l.t~inei,nu- itt (Iii-
niiljtiii.iiituis sli_i.ii’Iitilclei-’, .cci’ ‘.ictijent tti thu Iu’~jtii~l
income tax.” In contrast, income from sole proprietor-
ships or- partnerships is not taxed at the firm, only as
the owner’s personal income.
To reduce this distoi’tion, the President’s proposal
would allow corpor’ations to deduct from taxable in-
conic 10 per-cent oftheir’ dividend payout. Asshown in
table 3, this would result in a decline in tax revenues
dunng 1986—90 of about $24.8 billion.
iseu.tralitv J3n•~s air’d lit tune
iilea,cnre;nenl
Analogous to the nonneutrahties in the existing
depr’eciation deduction system are distortions in de-
termining taxable income fr’omn the production of as-
sets covering more than one tax year’.Examples are the
construction oflam-ge buildings or ships and the design
and production ofaircraft. This raises the issue of how
to tr’eat the costs of pr-oduction incurred befor’e the
sale. Economic theory suggests these costs should be
capitalized and deducted when the project is com-
pleted or sold; however, current tax law allows many
such costs to be deducted currently, while receipts
arenot taxed until received, perhaps years later’.Revis-
ing the tax code to r-equire matching of expenses and
income fr’oni multiperiod pr’oduction would raise cor’-
por-ate tax receipts by $39.7 billion over 1986—90.
The Presidents proposed tax reform would repeal
structur’al rehabilitation tax credits, yielding an in-
crease in corporate taxes of about $1.3 billion in
1986—90.” Also, the interest tax exemption for ptivate-
purpose state and municipal bonds — the so-called
industrial development bonds — would be r-epealed.
While this repeal would not increase corpor-ate tax
revenues, it would significantly reduce the number’ of
tax-exempt bond issues and increase individual tax
revenues — by an estimated 51.5.9 billion over’ 1986—90.
Nindrnlitw’l3iward .lnduslries
Repeal of Energy and Mining Subsidies — An im-
por’tant tax subsidy to the oil- and gas-producing
industry as well as other’ mining industries is percent-
age depletion. No longer’ available to lar-ge integrated
‘Taxprocedures thatavoid doubletaxation ofdividends arecommon
amongthe principal industrial countries. For example, France hasa
50 percent dividend tax credit, Germany effectively excludes 100
percent ofdividends paid from doubletaxation and Japan excludes
38 percent. See U.S. Treasury (1984), vol. I, p. 260.
‘°Individualtax revenues, including those from limited partnerships,
which are very common in real estate investment, would rise over
1986—90 by about $5 billion as a result of this repeal. (The Presi-
dent’s Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and
Simplicity. p. 459)
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petroleum producers, it primarily benefits small inde-
pendent producers. Percentage depletion allows
these small pr-oducers to deduct from taxable income
a fixed percentage of the value of production to com-
pensate for the reduction in the total amount remain-
ing.” In practice, it results in atotal deduction over-the
life of the well or mine that exceeds the capitalized
value of the deposit. The proposed reform would
phase out this subsidy of oil and mineral production
over the 1986—90 period, except foi oilwells with small
amounts of production.
Also to be repealed are the business ener~’ tax
credits. Originally, these credits wer’e introduced to
increase non-petroleum ener~”production, loweren-
er~’ use and enhance petroleum production from
technically difficult or deep deposits.
In total, the repeal of these energy and mineral
industr deposits would yield an increase in corpo-
rate tax revenues over 1986—90 of about $3 billion.
Repeal of Financial Institution Subsidies — As
shown in table 1, the tax rate levied on the U.S. finan-
cial and insurance industries has been substantially
lower than in other industries. Largely, this has been
due to tax subsidies that the reform proposal would
eliminate. Primarily, the form of these subsidies has
been to permit deductions from taxable income con-
tributions to reserves for various losses. Under the
proposed reforms, only the actual losses would be
deductible.
Overall, the Treasury’s proposed reforms of finan-
cial and insurance institution tax deductions would
raise corporate tax revenues during 1986—90 by $23.8
billion. In particular, the principal reforms are the
following estimated tax revenue gains during 1986—90
in parentheses):
• the repeal of the deduction for depositorv institu-
tions’ contribution tobad debt r-esei’ves $5.1 billion);
• the disallowance ofthededuction ofinterest paid by
financial institutions to finance purchase of tax-
exempt securities $2.2 billioni; and
“The rationale is that productionof the mineralessentially entailsthe
removal of a quantity from afixed inventory ofmineral, the original
deposit. Theproducer bought the mineral right, and it is being used
up in the production process. Thus, forthe samereason that aretail
department store deducts the cost of goods sold out of inventory
from its gross proceeds to compute taxable income, mineral pro-
ducers should deduct the proportion of the value ofcurrent period
production that was capitalized in the mineral lease. The proposal
does not dispute the proprietyof an appropriatelycomputed deduc-
tion for depletion. It does, however, dispute the fixed percentage
form whichis arbitrary in relation to the value of the deposit.
• a limit Onproperty and casualty insur-ance company
tax—deductible additions to reserves equal to the
capitalized value ofexpected claims ($5.6 bitliocu
.linpoe1 ofliefirm: Investment Yields
Less A/jeeted LvTdyes
The most important measures of the over-all impact
of tax reform, in terms of making the tax code more
neutral, at-c the tax r’ates displayed in table 6. Compar-
ing these rates with those under current law in table 4,
one can see two major differences: no impact on
investment due to inflation and nearly level tax rates
on investments of diverse durations.
While taxrates are consider-ably less variable across
types ofinvestments under the new tax plan, as levies
against corporate income, they are somewhat higher
on average. The net result may be a lower aggregate
investment rate. A decline in investment, however,
would not necessarily imply a lower’ level of output.
The more uniform tax rates on investments ensure
that investment will be induced by market demands
— the valuations of consumers — rather than tax
subsidies. A resulting decline in investment would
mean that some projects under-taken under the old
tax code were inefficient. The release of resources
from such inefficient investment would imply an im-
provement in welfare.
SiJ.MN1ARY ANI) COr~CLUSKTh
The taxation ofbusiness income in the United States
has evolved into a complex system of distortions,
subsidies and preferences, that has induced corpora-
tions to employ valuable resources inefficiently. Out-
put could be increased and people made better off if
these tax-generated distortions were eliminated. If it
becomes legislation, the President’s proposed busi-
ness tax reform would be a major step in reducing the
role that taxation plays in allocating our nation’s re-
sources. Those who concentrate on the macroeco-
nomic impacts ofthe proposal are overlooking some
substantial efficiency gains from the proposed
changes.
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